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Abstract 
 
We investigate how foreign aid dampens the effects of terrorism on FDI using interactive 
quantile regressions. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the 
period 1984-2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid variables are used, while terrorism dynamics 
entail: domestic, unclear, transnational and total number of terrorist attacks. The main finding 
is that foreign aid cannot be used as a policy tool to effectively address a hypothetically 
negative effect of terrorism on FDI. The positive threshold we cannot establish is important 
for policy makers because it communicates a cut-off point at which foreign aid completely 
neutralizes the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. From the conditioning information set, we 
also establish for the most part that the effects of GDP growth, infrastructural development 
and trade openness are an increasing function of FDI. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 Over the past decade, political instability, conflicts and terrorism have considerably 
influenced foreign direct investment (FDI) location decisions to developing countries. Some 
recent examples of violent activities that have affected FDI location include: sabotage 
activities in Nigeria’s oil Delta region by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (Obi, 2010; Onuoba, 2010; Akpan et al., 2013; Taylor, 2014); substantial  disruptions of  
oil production in Libya in the post-Gaddafi era (Gaub, 2014); recent Al-Qaeda attacks in In 
Amenas of Algeria (Onyeji et al., 2014) and the control of many petroleum installations in 
Syria  by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) (Le Billon, 2015; Celso, 2015). A 
number of solutions have been proposed in recent literature as means of preventing terrorism 
on the one hand and mitigating its negative externalities on economic development, on the 
other hand. These include: the importance of transparency (see Bell et al., 2015); the 
relevance of the rule of law (Choi, 2010); the role of educational channels (Brockhoff et al., 
2014) like bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); enhanced press freedom and publicity (Hoffman 
et al., 2013); the employment of military strategies and tactics (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010), 
behavioural investigations of attitudes towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007), policy 
harmonization against terrorism (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu et al., 2018a), the 
role of inclusive development, governance  and military expenditure in fighting the scourge 
(Asongu et al., 2017, 2018b) and the relevance of foreign aid in mitigating the effect of 
terrorism on trade (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017) and natural resources (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016, 2017a). 
To stem the activities of terrorist, and to sustain the flow of FDI into developing 
countries, recent studies have also been oriented towards the improvement of development 
assistance in reducing the potentially negative effect (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et 
al., 2015). Consistent with Efobi et al. (2015), the relevance of foreign aid in curbing the 
adverse consequences of terrorism on FDI in developing nations is a well-known convention. 
This consensus is motivated by the fact that countries that are affected by terrorism are 
economically poor and short of vital resources to fight the scourge (Bandyopadhyay & 
Younas, 2014). The authors maintain that the principal issue with terrorist activities in 
developing countries is that such countries have begun tailoring their foreign policy strategies 
to attract more foreign investment, and terrorist attack will be counter-productive to this goal.  
Against this background, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Lee (2017) have established that 
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developing assistance can mitigate this potentially counter-productive effect of terrorism in 
developing nations by providing the much needed finance to fight terrorist activities. 
 Whereas Efobi et al. (2015) have extended Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and 
Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2014) research by conditioning the mitigating role of 
development assistance on corruption-control levels in recipient countries, the present inquiry 
extends Efobi et al. (2015), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Bandyopadhyay and Younas 
(2014) by assessing the role of foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect of 
terrorism on FDI throughout the conditional distributions of FDI. Hence, for the purpose of 
comparison, we are consistent with the underlying studies in using a panel of 78 developing 
nations for the period 1984-2008. There are at least two other justifications for restricting the 
scope to developing countries: (i) the negative effects of terrorists’ activities have been 
established to be relatively more apparent in developing countries, compared to developed 
nations which can absorb terrorists’ activities without considerable negative externalities 
(Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009) and (ii) the impact of development assistance to less developed 
countries is apparent especially with regards to creating hard and soft infrastructure for 
development. Enders and Sandler (1996) have established a negative effect from terrorism to 
foreign direct investment, while Blomberg and Mody (2005) have shown that violence in the 
perspectives of revolutions, wars and terrorism deter international investment and such a 
deterrent effect is mainly apparent in developing countries. 
Focusing on foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect of terrorism on 
FDI throughout the conditional distributions of FDI is important because of current global 
efforts towards sustaining external flows like FDI in developing countries (Asiedu, 2006; 
Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Apkan et al., 2014; Boly, et al., 2015).   In essence: (i) FDI is important 
in driving the growth needed to mitigate extreme poverty and (ii) it is important to fight 
terrorism in order to create an enabling environment for growth. A Quantile regression (QR) 
is employed as estimation strategy. This technique which assesses the relationship throughout 
the conditional distribution of FDI is contrary to Efobi et al. (2015) and Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2014) who have assessed the underlying nexuses at the mean values of FDI. Whereas mean 
values are important, corresponding findings have blanket policy implications because all 
countries are provided with the same policy prescription.  This is different from the QR 
approach because a distinction is made between countries with low, intermediate and high 
initial levels of FDI. Given these insights, we argue that blanket policies are not likely to 
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succeed unless they are contingent on existing levels of FDI and tailored differently across 
countries with low, intermediate and high levels of FDI.  
 The main finding is that foreign aid cannot be effectively used as a policy tool to 
effectively address a hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI when considering the 
different FDI inflow levels across countries. The rest of the study is structured as follows: the 
review of the literature and theoretical underpinnings are discussed in Section 2, while. 
Section 3 covers the data and methodology. The empirical results and policy implications are 
engaged in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Literature review and theoretical underpinnings 
An important reason for desiring to stem the rise of terrorist activities is its devastating 
effect on global capital flow. There is a nascent body of literature (e.g. Humphreys, 2005; 
Koh, 2007; Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Meierrieks & Gries, 2013; Bandyopadhyay & 
Younas, 2014; Choi, 2015) that have given extensive attention to estimating the economic 
value of terrorist attacks on foreign investors. It is observed that terrorist attacks cost an 
average developing country a significant amount of foreign direct investment, and this 
depends on the origin of the attack (Efobi et al., 2015). This impact is significant for 
developing countries as the inflow of foreign investors is supposed to augment the prevalent 
resource gap from prevailing low savings, the declining state of development assistance, and 
poor integration of the region in the global capital market (Asiedu, 2006).  
Efobi et al. (2015) have extended Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Bandyopadhyay 
and Younas (2014) by conditioning the dampening role of foreign aid in the terrorism-FDI 
nexus across corruption-control levels in the recipient countries. The authors conclude that: (i) 
the negative impact of terrorism on FDI is only apparent in estimations with above-average 
corruption-control levels; (ii) development assistance dampens the negative impact of 
terrorism on FDI exclusively in countries with above-average corruption-control levels; (iii)  
the modifying role of bilateral aid on the effect of transnational terrorisms is consistent with 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014).  Moreover, the authors also find that the adverse impacts of 
unclear and total terrorism are mitigated by multilateral aid.  
The above literature allows for improvement in at least two main areas: the need to 
incorporate more terrorism dynamics into the investigated relationships and the relevance of 
FDI conditionality. Considering the need for more dynamics of terrorism, Choi (2015) has 
established in the terrorism-growth literature that it is important to use a plethora of variables 
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when investigating the nexus between terrorism and macroeconomic indicators. The author 
has shown that political instability variables have various effects across space and time. 
Hence, we are consistent with Efobi et al. (2015) in employing four terrorism indicators, 
namely: domestic, unclear, transnational and total terrorisms. Also, conditioning the assessed 
relationships on FDI levels may have relevant policy implications because blanket policies 
may be ineffective unless they are based on initial FDI levels, and are tailored distinctly 
across high-FDI and low-FDI developing countries. The empirical evidences motivating this 
intuition are the findings of Öcal and Yildirim (2010) which show that the effect of terrorism 
on economic prosperity depends on cross-regional initial levels of growth. The quantile 
regression empirical strategy adopted by this study is in accordance with this second 
contribution to the literature. 
It is also important to briefly highlight the theoretical underpinnings on which the 
study is based. Our study is also consistent with Akinwale (2010, p. 125) lines of inquiry that 
are focused on how to resolve conflicts and motivated by the Conflict Management Model of 
Thomas-Kilman and the Social Control Theory of Black. The former model has advanced 
strategic intentions that are very likely to surround a two-factor matrix (of assertiveness and 
cooperation) which when combined with collaboration, leads to five main styles of conflict 
management, namely: avoidance, competition, collaboration, accommodation and 
compromise. Considering the latter theory, the relationships among individuals, groups and 
organisations significantly affect the exercise of one of the five fundamental instruments of 
social control, namely: tolerance, self-help, settlement, negotiation and avoidance. The 
accounts of Akinwale are broadly consistent with the conflict management literature, inter 
alia: Black (1990), Thomas (1992), Borg (1992) and Volkema and Bergmann (1995).  
The theoretical underpinnings converge with the present paper in the perspective that 
foreign aid is a policy variable that influences conditions articulated by the Social Control 
theory and Conflict Management Model. Accordingly, development assistance, among others, 
increases education, improves compliance with the rule of law, increases government 
expenditure and encourages social responsibility. For instance, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) 
have established that terrorism decreases growth potentials by reducing government 
expenditure allocated for growth-enhancing investments. For brevity and lack of space, the 
interested reader can have more insights into other factors (respect for the rule of law, 
education and social responsibility) from the wealth of studies on political violence and 
instability (e.g. Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008a, 2008b; Oreopoulos & 
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Salvanes, 2009; Campos & Gassebner, 2013). Given the above, the testable hypothesis of the 
present line of inquiry is as follows: we examine the role of foreign aid in mitigating a 
hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI. 
It is also important to articulate why different types of terrorism can affect FDI 
differently. This is essentially because four main types of terrorism are used in this study, 
namely: domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism. 
Consistent with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014, p. 20), we exclusively elucidate differences 
between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism because of two main reasons. On the 
one hand, the theoretical underpinnings of unclear terrorism are difficult to ascertain. On the 
other hand, total terrorism is the sum of the three types of terrorism. Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2014) theoretically demonstrate that when the impacts of transnational and domestic terror 
on FDI are compared, the deleterious effect from transnational terrorism is higher.  This is 
essentially because the marginal effect associated with transnational terrorism is stronger 
given that domestic terrorism increases the foreign company’s threat perception for the host 
country at a slower rate compared to transnational terrorism.  The underlying inequality in 
responsiveness is more apparent when transnational groups are in pursuit of foreign 
investment which depicts the very notion behind transnational terror.  
In the light of the above, the main objective of the study is to assess thresholds at 
which foreign aid mitigates the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI. Threshold 
within the context of this inquiry is a critical mass of foreign aid that is relevant for informing 
policy. Accordingly, a positive threshold is important for policy makers because it 
communicates a cut-off point at which foreign aid completely neutralizes the negative effect 
of terrorism on FDI. Hence, above this threshold, foreign aid interacts with terrorism to 
improve FDI. The establishment of a positive threshold requires a positive estimated effect 
from the interaction between the policy variable (foreign aid) and the policy syndrome 
(terrorism). Otherwise when the estimated interactive effect is negative, a negative threshold 
is more likely to be apparent.  Such a conception and definition of threshold is in accordance 
with recent literature, notably: the need for a certain level in language proficiency before 
advantages in a second language are enjoyed (Cummins, 2000); a turning point for an 
appealing economic outcome (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015) and requirements for 
Kuznets and U-shaped curves (Ashraf & Galor, 2013).   
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 Consistent with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015), we examine a 
panel of 781 developing countries with three year non-overlapping intervals data for the 
period 1984-2008. The choice of sample size and periodicity are based on: (i) availability of 
foreign aid and terrorism data; and (ii) constraints in the availability of other variables in the 
conditioning information set. 
Whereas the dependent variable is net FDI flows as a percentage of GDP, the main 
independent variable of interest consists of terrorism dynamics, namely: unclear, domestic, 
transnational and total terrorisms. Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, 
p. 6). Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve the 
nationals of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and 
supporters are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism 
including those acts that concern at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, 
supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from 
another”. Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither 
be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of 
domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms (Asongu & Biekpe, 2018; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017b).  
We employ two development assistance ‘modifying variables’ in the interactive 
regressions: multilateral and bilateral aid. The adopted control variables are: trade openness, 
GDP growth, inflation and infrastructural development. The choice of these dependent, 
independent, modifying and control variables are consistent with the underlying studies 
motivating this line of inquiry.  
We now devote some space to briefly provide further justification for the choice of our 
variables. Development assistance provides economic resources, much needed for logistical 
                                                          
1The panel includes the following developing countries : “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El 
Salvador, Kenya, Panama, Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, 
Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, 
Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, 
Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and 
Sudan”. It is important to note that some countries may be more developed than others (e.g. Malta). 
Unfortunately, we are employing a dataset from Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and are leaving it unchanged for 
the purpose of comparing our findings with those of the underlying study.  
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and infrastructural investments in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, it may also create an 
enabling environment for decreasing political instability and non-violence by providing 
resources like human capital (Asiedu et al., 2009). It follows that education; especially 
lifelong-learning can reduce the proportion of vulnerable citizens recruited for terrorist 
activities. The interest of decomposing aggregated foreign aid into its multilateral and 
bilateral components is to enable more options for policy implications (Asiedu & Nandwa, 
2007; Johnson & Quartery, 2009; Asiedu, 2014; Efobi et al., 2014)2.  
The choice of control variables are also in line with mainstream FDI literature 
(Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu & Lien, 2011). Drawing from the literature, we expect trade openness, 
GDP growth and infrastructural development to positively affect FDI, while inflation should 
have a negative effect. Accordingly, GDP growth pulls foreign investment owing to 
anticipated returns of investment. Trade openness is most likely to be positively associated 
with FDI because FDI activities entail the importing and exporting of raw materials and 
finished commodities. This narrative should be balanced with the fact that there may be a 
substitution effect of FDI if there are high trade barriers (Barrell & Pain, 1999). Developing 
countries with better infrastructural development intuitively have an edge in attracting FDI 
owing to relatively lower transaction and production costs, ceteris paribus. We expect high 
inflation to reduce foreign investment prospects due to, inter alia: (i) a negative economic 
outlook and (ii) reducing purchasing power and domestic consumption.  
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
Foreign Investment FDI Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (% of GDI)  
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) and 
Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) 
   
Trade Openness  LnTrade Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational terrorism Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
    
                                                          
2
 Asiedu and Nandwa (2007), Johnson and Quartey (2009), Asiedu (2014) and Efobi et al. (2014) consistently 
articulate the need to integrate foreign aid heterogeneity.  
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GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators. All variables were sourced from 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015).  
 
 Table 1 summarises the definition of the variables, while Table 2 provides the 
summary statistics. Some of the variables have been defined in logarithms in the former to 
enable the comparison of ‘mean values’ in the latter. The substantial variation informs us that 
reasonable estimated linkages would emerge from the empirical analysis.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs. 
      
Foreign Direct Investment 2.494 3.240 -8.875 26.067 612 
      
GDP growth 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
      
Trade Openness (ln) 4.118 0.534 2.519 5.546 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Domestic terrorism 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs.: Observations. 
 
 The purpose of Table 3 is to decrease potential issues of over-parameterization and 
multicollinearity that are articulated in bold. As expected, terrorism and foreign aid variables 
are highly correlated. Hence, we avoid employing two foreign aid or terrorism variables in the 
same specification. We also notice that while the dependent variable is negatively correlated 
with terrorism variables, it is also negatively (positively) correlated with bilateral 
(multilateral) aid. Whereas the negative correlation between FDI and bilateral aid is contrary 
to the intuition motivating the testable hypothesis enunciated in the introduction, however, 
two justifications motivate pursuing the line of inquiry. First, it is standard in econometrics 
that correlations should not be assimilated to causalities. Second, the bilateral aid variable is 
employed as a modifying policy variable. Hence, it could interact with terrorism to reveal 
other unexpected dynamics.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
            
 Control Variables Foreign Aid Terrorism Dynamics   
FDI GDPg LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnBilaid LuMulaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.193 0.430 0.263 -0.113 -0.049 0.001 -0.118 -0.093 -0.112 -0.121 FDI 
 1.000 0.089 0.065 -0.236 0.195 0.178 -0.058 -0.021 -0.042 -0.055 GDPg 
  1.000 0.296 -0.230 -0.267 -0.289 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 LnTrade 
   1.000 -0.121 -0.376 -0.514 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 LnTel 
    1.000 -0.047 -0.023 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 LnInflation 
     1.000 0.721 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 Domter 
        1.000 0.528 0.785 Tranater 
         1.000 0.789 Unclter 
          1.000 Totter 
            
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. LnTrade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. 
LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  Domter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational 
terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total number of terrorism incidents.    
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Consistent  with the literature on conditional determinants (Billger & Goel, 2009), and 
in order to examine if existing levels in FDI affect the incidence of terrorism and/or foreign 
aid  on ‘FDI location decisions’ in developing countries, we employ a quantile regression 
(QR) approach. It entails investigating the determinants of FDI throughout the distributions of 
FDI (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies on FDI determinants have reported estimated parameters at the 
conditional mean of FDI (Apkan et al., 2014; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015).  
While mean impacts are important, we extend the underlying stream of literaure by 
employing QR to distinguish between initial levels of FDI. For example, while Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) is based on the assumption that FDI  and error terms are distributed normally, 
the QR approach is not founded on the hypothesis that error  terms are normally distributed. 
Hence, the techinque enables us to examine the impact of terrorism on FDI with particular 
emphasis on best- and worst-performing countries (in terms of FDI flow) among the sampled 
developing nations. In essence, with QR, parameter estimates are derived at multiple points of 
the conditional distributions of FDI (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). The employed QR technique 
is increasingly being adopted in development literature, among others, in corruption studies 
(Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). 
The  th quantile estimator of FDI is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the purpose of 
simplicity and ease of presentation.   
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where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
instance the 25th or 75th quartiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of FDI or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(  ,                                                                                                         (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of FDI. For the model in Eq. (2), the dependent 
variable iy  is the FDI indicator while ix  contains a constant term, trade, inflation, 
infrastructure, and GDP growth. The specifications in Eq. (1) are tailored to mitigate the 
multicollinearity and over-parameterization issues identified in Table 3. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical findings presented in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively correspond to 
bilateral aid and multilateral aid regressions. Panel A (B) of both Tables presents findings for 
domestic and transnational (unclear and total) terrorisms. Consistent with the motivation 
discussed in the methodological section, an OLS baseline specification is provided to 
articulate modelling differences between conditional means and median values of FDI. Hence, 
the interest of adopting the QR technique is justified by differences in significance and 
magnitude of estimated coefficients between the OLS and QR results. In accordance with 
Brambor et al. (2006), the overall effect of the modifying development assistance variable on 
the examined relationship is assessed in terms of marginal effects.  
The following can be established for Table 4 on the relationships among FDI, 
terrorism and bilateral aid. First, in Panel A, the unconditional impact of domestic terrorism 
on FDI is positive in the 10th decile and 25th quartile of the Left Hand Side (LHS), whereas the 
unconditional effect of transnational terrorism is negative for the 25th quartile in the Right 
Hand Side (RHS).  In Panel B, the unconditional effect of unclear terrorism is consistently 
insignificant on the LHS, while the unconditional impact of total terrorism is positively 
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significant in the  25th quartile of the RHS. Second, the unconditional effect of foreign aid is 
consistently positive only in bottom quantiles of the FDI distributions. Third, contrary to the 
intuition motivating the study, interactions between terrorism and foreign aid do not 
significantly increase FDI as expected. On the contrary, we find that the combined effect on 
FDI is negative, in: (i) bottom quantiles in the LHS of Panel A for ‘domestic terrorism and 
bilateral aid’ and (ii) the 25th quartile in the RHS of Panel B, for ‘total terrorism and bilateral 
aid’. Only the modifying negative threshold for ‘bilateral aid and domestic terrorism’ is 
within the range (0.765 to 8.362) provided by the summary statistics, notably: 5.5 
(0.011/0.002) and 9 (0.009/0.001) respectively for (i) and (ii).  
The significant control variables have the expected signs. While the effect of inflation 
is consistently not significant, the other control variables consistently display increasing 
returns to foreign investment. Hence, the positive impact of GDP growth, infrastructure and 
trade increase from low to high quantiles of the FDI distributions. The increasing returns to 
FDI imply, the benefits of corresponding variables in stimulating FDI consistently increase 
with higher initial levels of FDI. In other words, the positive responsiveness of FDI to the 
variables increases with increasing levels of FDI. 
 
Table 4: FDI, Bilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism  
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -9.43*** -2.50*** -4.38*** -4.58*** -8.68*** -11.3*** -9.43*** -2.23*** -3.94*** -4.57*** -9.041*** -11.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Domter 0.004 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.343) (0.000) (0.001) (0.471) (0.799) (0.601)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 -0.007 -0.064* -0.012 -0.003 0.040 
       (0.985) (0.835) (0.076) (0.850) (0.983) (0.772) 
LnBilaid 0.190* 0.222*** 0.202*** 0.116 0.219 0.143 0.181 0.173*** 0.152*** 0.101 0.229 0.146 
 (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.196) (0.562) (0.115) (0.001) (0.000) (0.201) (0.163) (0.551) 
Domter × LnBilaid -0.001 -
0.002*** 
-
0.002*** 
-0.001 0.0002 0.0006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.202) (0.001) (0.000) (0.414) (0.941) (0.820)       
Tranater × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.003 0.0004 0.009 0.001 -0.004 -0.009 
       (0.778) (0.936) (0.136) (0.917) (0.880) (0.635) 
GDP growth 0.133*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.127*** 0.190** 0.135*** 0.039** 0.066*** 0.076*** 0.123** 0.184** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.021) (0.022) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.043) 
LnTrade 2.322*** 0.284*** 0.871*** 1.129*** 2.327*** 3.376*** 2.332*** 0.295*** 0.829*** 1.138*** 2.400*** 3.437*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.107 -0.016 -0.009 0.001 0.096 0.213 0.108 0.002 -0.016 0.011 0.091 0.177 
 (0.331) (0.662) (0.796) (0.976) (0.444) (0.295) (0.323) (0.956) (0.688) (0.853) (0.451) (0.386) 
LnInfrastructure  0.401*** 0.213*** 0.313*** 0.569*** 0.500** 0.724** 0.403*** 0.162*** 0.303*** 0.570*** 0.526*** 0.704** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.041) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.216 0.040 0.107 0.142 0.150 0.201 0.216 0.040 0.105 0.142 0.149 0.197 
Fisher  19.47***      18.11***      
Observations  546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
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 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -9.38*** -2.24*** -4.08*** -4.51*** -8.24*** -10.8*** -9.41*** -2.31*** -4.35*** -4.58*** -8.587*** -11.1*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Unclter  0.001 0.021 0.001 0.020 -0.046 -0.128 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.963) (0.215) (0.954) (0.764) (0.173) (0.437)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003 0.001 0.009** 0.004 -0.003 -0.008 
       (0.449) (0.458) (0.011) (0.474) (0.821) (0.531) 
LnBilaid 0.171 0.186*** 0.167*** 0.099 0.172 0.096 0.189* 0.195*** 0.201*** 0.115 0.221 0.133 
 (0.117) (0.000) (0.003) (0.196) (0.370) (0.691) (0.093) (0.000) (0.000) (0.115) (0.215) (0.579) 
Unclter × LnBilaid -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.016 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.801) (0.167) (0.776) (0.706) (0.796) (0.581)       
Totter × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0009 -0.0004 -
0.001*** 
-0.0009 0.0001 0.0007 
       (0.272) (0.360) (0.000) (0.418) (0.961) (0.740) 
GDP growth 0.135*** 0.044** 0.066*** 0.080*** 0.141** 0.207** 0.134*** 0.044** 0.064*** 0.078*** 0.125** 0.193** 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.025) (0.023) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.002) (0.031) (0.038) 
LnTrade 2.337*** 0.279*** 0.845*** 0.137*** 2.257*** 3.319*** 2.320*** 0.272*** 0.863*** 1.130*** 2.310*** 3.347*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.099 -0.012 -0.013 -0.0006 0.079 0.193 0.107 -0.0008 -0.009 0.0001 0.090 0.220 
 (0.366) (0.752) (0.758) (0.991) (0.589) (0.348) (0.331) (0.984) (0.827) (0.998) (0.495) (0.294) 
LnInfrastructure  0.390*** 0.180*** 0.300*** 0.556*** 0.547** 0.729** 0.401*** 0.192*** 0.316*** 0.568*** 0.495** 0.729** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.014) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.016) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.216 0.039 0.105 0.142 0.149 0.199 0.216 0.040 0.107 0.142 0.150 0.200 
Fisher  20.24***      19.65***      
Observations  546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. 
R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where FDI is least. 
 
The following can be established for Table 5 on the relationships among FDI, 
terrorism and multilateral aid. First, in Panel A, the unconditional impact of domestic 
terrorism on FDI is positive in the 25th quartile of the LHS and bottom distributions of the 
RHS for transnational terrorism. In Panel B, the unconditional effects of unclear and total 
terrorisms are not significant. Second, the unconditional effect of foreign aid is consistently 
positive with increasing returns to FDI. That is, the impact consistently increases in 
magnitude from bottom to top quantiles of the FDI distribution. Third, contrary to the 
intuition motivating the study, the interactions between terrorism and multilateral aid does not 
significantly increase FDI as expected. On the contrary, we find that the effect on FDI is 
negative, in: (i) the 25th quartile of the LHS of Panel A for ‘domestic terrorism and 
multilateral aid’ and (ii) bottom quantiles of the RHS of Panel A for ‘transnational terrorism 
and multilateral aid’.  
The modifying negative thresholds of multilateral aid are within the range (-1.249 and 
7.105) provided by the summary statistics, notably: 4.00 (0.004/0.001) for ‘domestic 
terrorism’ and 3.13 (0.047/0.015) and 3.90 (0.039/0.010)’for the 10th decile and 25th quartile 
of transnational terrorism respectively.  
15 
 
On the control variables, with the exception of GDP growth for which the evidence of 
positive increasing returns to FDI is not very apparent, their significances and magnitudes are 
broadly consistent with those established in Table 4, notably: (i) the insignificant effect of 
inflation and (ii) evidence of increasing returns to FDI from the effects of trade openness and 
infrastructural development.  
When the findings from Table 4 and Table 5 are compared and contrasted in the light 
of thresholds, it is apparent that only negative thresholds have been established because of the 
overwhelming evidence of negative estimated effects from interactions between foreign and 
terrorism variables. It is important to note that, had the estimated interactive effects been 
positive, positive thresholds would have been established because the corresponding 
unconditional effects from terrorism dynamics would have been negative3. The positive 
thresholds would have represented critically masses at which a foreign aid completely 
dampens the negative unconditional effect of terrorism on FDI.  
 
 
Table 5: FDI, Multilateral aid, Terrorism 
             
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -11.1*** -2.71*** -4.56*** -6.08*** -9.35*** -14.5*** -11.2*** -2.58*** -4.22*** -6.15*** -9.74*** -13.92*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Domter 0.007** 0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.0007 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.012) (0.308) (0.030) (0.196) (0.798) (0.984)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.049** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.021 0.010 0.022 
       (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.237) (0.886) (0.600) 
LnMulaid 0.454*** 0.192*** 0.230*** 0.281*** 0.479*** 0.690*** 0.460*** 0.193*** 0.220*** 0.250*** 0.460** 0.710*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) 
Domter × LnMulaid -
0.002*** 
-0.0002 -
0.001*** 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.004) (0.520) (0.008) (0.045) (0.627) (0.426)       
Tranater × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.017** -
0.015*** 
-
0.010*** 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.013 
       (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.213) (0.742) (0.303) 
GDP growth 0.108*** 0.039* 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.084 0.169* 0.108*** 0.044* 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.089 0.168* 
 (0.002) (0.070) (0.001) (0.008) (0.169) (0.060) (0.002) (0.065) (0.000) (0.005) (0.159) (0.097) 
LnTrade 2.45*** 0.441*** 0.916*** 1.330*** 2.187*** 3.484*** 2.480*** 0.399*** 0.843*** 1.375*** 2.303*** 3.337*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.123 -0.026 -0.019 0.017 0.083 0.197 0.130 -0.023 -0.009 0.031 0.075 0.129 
 (0.268) (0.585) (0.643) (0.713) (0.597) (0.348) (0.240) (0.639) (0.787) (0.504) (0.614) (0.608) 
LnInfrastructure  0.651*** 0.240*** 0.434*** 0.723*** 0.869*** 1.289*** 0.649*** 0.278*** 0.403*** 0.674*** 0.874*** 1.349*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.239 0.036 0.113 0.151 0.161 0.222 0.238 0.038 0.113 0.149 0.160 0.218 
Fisher 19.35***      18.80***      
Observations  543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 
                                                          
3
 This assertion is based on the assumption that, in interactive regressions, the unconditional effects have a sign 
that is opposite to the sign of the conditional effects.  
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 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -11.1*** -13.9*** -4.03*** -5.72*** -8.96*** -14.0*** -11.1*** -2.73*** -4.45*** -6.10*** -9.34*** -14.01*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unclter  0.023 0.007 -0.003 0.009 0.008 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.273) (0.676) (0.979) (0.710) (0.899) (0.977)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
       (0.016) (0.306) (0.153) (0.211) (0.828) (0.897) 
LnMulaid 0.426*** 0.191*** 0.179*** 0.218*** 0.443*** 0.675*** 0.454*** 0.194*** 0.221*** 0.279*** 0.480*** 0.678*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.004) 
Unclter × LnMulaid -0.006* -0.001 0.0001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.099) (0.595) (0.949) (0.635) (0.711) (0.705)       
Totter × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -
0.001*** 
-0.0002 -
0.0007** 
-0.001* -0.0008 -0.001 
       (0.004) (0.504) (0.046) (0.062) (0.637) (0.700) 
GDP growth 0.110*** 0.036 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.090 0.169* 0.108*** 0.039* .055*** 0.048** 0.084 0.170 
 (0.002) (0.104) (0.000) (0.003) (0.118) (0.084) (0.002) (0.076) (0.000) (0.010) (0.169) (0.070) 
LnTrade 2.480*** 0.434*** 0.835*** 1.294*** 2.15*** 3.40*** 2.456*** 0.443*** 0.901*** 1.337*** 2.187*** 3.36*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.120 -0.015 -0.012 0.033 0.031 0.159 0.124 -0.023 -0.019 0.016 0.080 0.171 
 (0.279) (0.748) (0.749) (0.511) (0.821) (0.517) (0.267) (0.628) (0.620) (0.739) (0.596) (0.438) 
LnInfrastructure  0.634*** 0.244*** 0.381*** 0.681*** 0.866*** 1.267*** 0.650*** 0.239*** 0.422*** 0.721**** 0.867*** 1.300*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.236 0.036 0.112 0.148 0.160 0.220 0.238 0.036 0.113 0.150 0.161 0.222 
Fisher 20.00***      19.55***      
Observations  543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 
             
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where FDI is least. 
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and implication  
 We set-out to examine how foreign aid can be employed to mitigate the hypothetically 
negative influence of terrorism on FDI in developing countries. The findings have been mixed 
with expected and unexpected relationships. While we expected development assistance to 
boost FDI, the positive influence of terrorism on FDI is quite unexpected.  With the slight 
exception of transnational terrorism on the RHS of Panel A in Table 4, we have consistently 
observed the latter tendency, notably the positive impact of terrorism dynamics, in: (i) 
bottoms quantiles with domestic terrorism and the 25th quartile with total terrorism, for 
bilateral aid regressions and (ii) the 25th quartile with domestic terrorism and bottom quantiles 
of transnational terrorism, for multilateral aid regressions.  
 A number of reasons can be advanced for the unexpected results. First, from a broad 
perspective, terrorism may not significantly affect FDI location decisions in developing 
countries. Accordingly, some foreign investment decisions may even be motivated by high 
returns owing to higher underlying risks. For instance, according to Obi (2008), China has 
been increasing her investment in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, despite the threatening 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). This justification is consistent 
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with the stream of literature on China targeting investment projects in less developing 
countries that are fragile and politically unstable (Tull, 2006; De Grauwe et al., 2012). 
Second, another possible elucidation to the unexpected findings may be traceable to the fact 
that prior to the 2011 Arab Spring; terrorism incidences have not been very alarming. 
Accordingly, consistent with the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13), global 
terrorism activities have been soaring substantially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Third, 
there is a wealth of literature on the nexus between terrorism and macroeconomic variables 
with the consensus that terrorism might not have very significant negative effects on 
economic development, especially in countries with comparatively higher levels of 
development (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009). The consistently insignificant effects of unclear 
and total terrorism dynamics in Panel B of Table 5 broadly attest to this position. Moreover, 
the varying effects of terrorism in terms of signs and insignificance could find explanations in 
Meierrieks and Gries (2013) if the findings are strongly influenced by Latin American 
countries because our sample makes no distinction between the ‘Cold war’ and ‘post-Cold 
war’ eras. In analysing the effect of terrorism on economic development, the underlying 
authors have used two sub-samples (the Cold war and post-Cold war eras) to conclude that the 
nexus varies across space and time. According to the account, in the Cold war époque, growth 
is established to have swayed terrorists’ activities in nations with intermediate development 
levels that experienced political instability and terrorism in Latin America. Conversely, in the 
post-‘Cold war’ era, terrorists’ activities are established to exert more negative economic 
consequences in Islamic and African nations experiencing: (i) growing terrorism and (ii) high 
rates of political openness and political instability. This third explanation is expositional and 
should be treated with caution until it is empirically verified.  
 The immediately preceding narrative has three main implications.  (1) The post-2011 
impact of terrorism on FDI may be substantially different from the findings established in this 
study. (2) Low incidences of terrorism have positively affected FDI location decisions. (3) It 
may be important to also account for the ‘terrorism heterogeneity’ from regional perspectives 
(Africa versus Latin America for instance) in order to understand how regional dynamics 
play-out in the underlying relationships. In the present line of inquiry, we have only 
incorporated heterogeneity in terms of types of terrorisms.  
 Second, on the effects of foreign aid dynamics, we have seen that while the 
unconditional effects of multilateral aid are consistently significant with positive increasing 
returns to FDI, bilateral aid is only positively significant in the bottom quantiles of FDI 
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distributions. The latter tendency is not very surprising because, from a preliminary analysis 
based on correlation coefficients, we found bilateral aid to be negatively correlated with FDI. 
Three implications could be derived. (1) Bilateral aid correlations with economic variables 
should be treated with caution unless backed by some more robust empirical evidence. (2) 
The instrumentality of bilateral aid in stimulating FDI is more effective in developing 
countries with lower initial levels of FDI. (3) The relevance of multilateral aid in stimulating 
FDI grows consistently with increasing levels of initial FDI.   
 It is important to devote some space to presenting our perspective of why the findings 
of bilateral aid are substantially different from those of multilateral aid.  A possible 
elucidation for the difference is that, bilateral aid may be accompanied with more ‘political 
economy’ strings relative to multilateral aid (Efobi & Nnadi, 2015). It makes sense to infer 
that bilateral aid is associated with more strings because, since it involves only two parties, a 
consensus on the strings to attach can easily be reached. Conversely, with multilateral aid, 
multiple donors with potentially very conflicting interests are involved. Whereas a recent 
literature survey has established no consistent evidence on the effectiveness of bilateral aid 
vis-à-vis multilateral aid in the development outcomes of recipient countries (Biscaye et al., 
2015), what is granted in our explanation is its consistency with common sense and evidence 
that bilateral aid to former colonies (from former colonial powers) is strongly tailored in view 
of preserving colonial legacies and strategic interests. Accordingly, evidence of positive 
increasing returns to FDI established in our findings may be due to conflicting strategic 
interests of multilateral donors which may indulge the donors to allocate aid essentially on 
FDI development outcomes.  
 A third issue of contention from our findings is that, interactions between terrorism 
and foreign aid dynamics unexpectedly yield negative effects on FDI. This is visible 
exclusively in bottom quantiles of FDI distributions. Notably, this tendency is apparent in 
interactions between: (i) bilateral aid and domestic terrorism in bottom quantiles, (ii) 
multilateral aid and domestic terrorism in the 25th quartile and (iii) multilateral aid and 
transnational terrorism for the bottom quantiles. Moreover, we also notice that on average, the 
threshold value for bilateral aid (5.5) is higher than those for multilateral aid (4.00, 3.13 and 
3.90). This implies, more bilateral aid is needed to change the positive effect of domestic 
terrorism on FDI relative to the amount of multilateral aid needed to reverse the positive gains 
of domestic and transnational terrorisms on FDI. 
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 Drawing from the literature, a possible elucidation for the negative interactive 
dynamic could be traceable to the political economy of development assistance because some 
aid categories, allocated for the fight against terrorism, may be inconsistent with the intended 
purposes of fighting terrorism. This is even more likely when the policy initiative is not 
substantiated with an established negative effect of terrorism on FDI.   It is also important to 
note that foreign aid allocated to boost government revenue in the fight against terrorism may 
not have an incremental effect on overall government income because recent literature has 
established that overly reliance on foreign aid could reduce domestic tax incomes and hence: 
(i) less political accountability and representation, and (ii) more political instability and 
violence. This narrative is consistent with Eubank (2012) on Somaliland. Therefore, as a 
policy implication, it is relevant to have insights into the initial or underlying impact of 
terrorism on FDI before allocating foreign aid to mitigate a ‘potentially negative effect’ which 
in real terms, may be ‘positive’.  While the discussion of results could read as quite uncritical 
of international/multilateral aid, it is interesting to note that there are also political biases, 
which might be, nevertheless, not as rampant for bilateral aid. 
  
5. Conclusion, caveat and future research directions 
This study has extended the literature on nexuses between foreign aid, terrorism and 
FDI by assessing the role of foreign aid on the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI. 
Using an interactive quantile regressions approach, we have steered clear of previous studies 
by investigating the problem statement throughout the conditional distributions for FDI. The 
empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008. 
Bilateral and multilateral aid variables are used, while terrorism dynamics entail: domestic, 
unclear, transnational and total indicators. The following findings have been established. First, 
while the effects of multilateral aid are consistently significant with evidence of positive 
increasing returns to FDI, bilateral aid is only positively significant in the bottom quantiles. 
Second, with the slight exception of transnational terrorism in bilateral aid regressions, the 
impacts of terrorism dynamics are unexpectedly positive, in: (i) bottom quantiles with 
domestic terrorism and the 25th quartile with total terrorism, for bilateral aid regressions and 
(ii) the 25th quartile with domestic terrorism and bottom quantiles of transnational terrorism, 
for multilateral aid regressions. Third, interactions between terrorism and foreign aid 
dynamics unexpectedly yield a negative effect on FDI, notably in:  (i) bilateral aid and 
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domestic terrorism in bottom quantiles, (ii) multilateral aid and domestic terrorism in the 25th 
quartile; (iii) multilateral aid and transnational terrorism for the bottom quantiles. Moreover, 
the modifying threshold value of bilateral aid is higher relative to that of multilateral aid. 
Fourth, there are positive increasing returns to FDI from GDP growth, infrastructural 
development and trade openness on FDI.  The positive increasing returns imply, the benefits 
of corresponding variables in stimulating FDI consistently increase with higher initial levels 
of FDI. The main finding is that foreign aid cannot be effectively used as a policy tool to 
effectively address a hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI. Policy implications 
have been discussed.   
Though not uncommon in the quantile regressions literature (see Billger & Goel, 
2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012), the main caveat of the study is that we have not controlled for 
country and time fixed effects in the modelling. The analysis leaves room for the following 
future lines of inquiry: (i) investigating by what mechanisms terrorism positively affects FDI, 
(ii) clarifying why development assistance and terrorism interact to have a negative impact on 
FDI, (iii) examining the underlying nexuses with a post-2011 terrorism sample (iv) 
decomposing foreign aid into more components and (v) accounting for regional heterogeneity 
in the examined nexuses.  
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